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Abstract 
Geographical clusters in health expenditures are well documented and accounting for spatial interactions may 
contribute to properly identify the factors affecting the use of health services the most. As for hospital care, 
spillovers may derive from strategic behaviour of hospitals and from patients’ preferences that may induce 
mobility across jurisdictions, as well as from geographically-concentrated risk factors, knowledge transfer and 
interactions between different layers of care. Our paper focuses on a largely overlooked potential source of 
spillovers in hospital expenditure: the heterogeneity of primary care providers’ behaviour. To do so, we 
analyse expenditures associated to avoidable hospitalisations separately from expenditures for highly complex 
treatments, as the former are most likely affected by General Practitioners, while the latter are not. We use 
administrative data for Italy’s Region Emilia Romagna between 2007 and 2010. Since neighbouring districts 
may belong to different Local Health Authorities (LHAs), we employ a spatial contiguity matrix that allows to 
investigate the effects of geographical and institutional proximity and use it to estimate Spatial Autoregressive 
and Spatial Durbin Models. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the seminal contributions by Wennberg and Gittelsohn (1973), regional and small area 
variations in health expenditures have received a great deal of attention and, by now, ample 
empirical evidence shows that expenditures may vary substantially across practices, municipalities 
and regions. More recently, the health economics literature has documented the presence of spatial 
clustering implying that geographically close observations often display more similar patterns 
compared to those located far apart (Skinner 2011). Applying spatial econometrics methods, an 
increasing number of contributions has investigated spatial interactions in the healthcare sector 
focusing mainly on spillovers across regions or neighbouring jurisdictions (Costa-Font and Moscone 
2009, Yu et al. 2013). This stream of works has covered a broad range of expenditure sources, 
including regional (Costa-Font and Pons-Novell, 2007), hospital (Bech and Lauridsen 2008), 
pharmaceutical (Ehlhert and Oberschachtsiek, 2014), mental health (Moscone et al, 2007), general 
practice (Bech and Lauridsen, 2009a) and outpatient expenditures (Bech and Lauridsen, 2009b). 
Overall, spatial dependence is found to generate a sizeable impact on the patterns of expenditures 
and to significantly affect the estimates of their determinants.  
As for hospital expenditures, the main causes of spatial spillovers have been identified, on the supply 
side, in the competition across hospital providers and in the knowledge transfer influencing local 
practice styles, while, on the demand side, in the heterogeneity in patients’ health profiles and 
preferences (Gravelle et al. 2014; Baltagi and Yen 2014). More recently, a different stream of works 
has focused on primary care as a key channel that affects hospital utilisation (e.g. Martin et al. 2010; 
Dusheiko et al. 2011; Gibson et al. 2013). This attention is a consequence of the increasing 
policymaker’s attempt to strengthen the role of General Practitioners (GPs) as promoters of an 
efficient use of health services through appropriate referrals to inpatient or outpatient services 
(Bech and Lauridsen, 2009; Beales and Smith 2012).  
The main aim of the present paper is to fill a gap in the literature by building a bridge between the 
contributions that investigate spatial interactions in hospital utilization and the studies on the 
influence of primary care on intensity and appropriateness in the use of the hospital. To do so, we 
adopt spatial econometrics methods to analyse clustering in per-patient hospital expenditures and 
we focus in particular on the influence produced by geographical differences in primary care 
organization. As long as local policies and conditions affect GPs’ activity and gatekeeping to 
secondary care, the variety of primary care policies often observed across jurisdictions can 
contribute to generating spatial correlations in hospital expenditures by affecting referral patterns. 
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Therefore, for properly assessing the determinants of hospital expenditures, it is important to 
account for the spillovers across areas characterized by differences in the governance of primary 
care and in the associated initiatives, as this will allow policymakers to better evaluate the impact 
and effectiveness of the existing policies and to properly target their interventions.  
A second relevant issue addressed in our analysis is the distinction between geographical and 
institutional proximity. In contexts where local jurisdictions enjoy a large degree of autonomy, and in 
particular when a multi-tier government organisation is involved, not only geographical distance but 
also institutional borders have to be considered among the factors that may significantly affect the 
intensity of spillover effects (Arbia et al. 2009; Atella et al. 2014). As for the first issue, the influence 
of common epidemiological and supply side characteristics, together with imitation patterns are 
expected to be stronger for closer units compared to more distant ones. As for the second issue, 
since subjects in the same jurisdiction face the same regulatory framework and incentive structure, 
expenditures for those units located within the same borders are expected to follow more similar 
patterns compared to those in different jurisdictions.  
We use administrative data from Italy’s Region Emilia Romagna to jointly investigate the impact of 
geographical and institutional proximity on hospital expenditures. In the Italian National Health 
System (NHS), each Local Health Authority (LHA) is subdivided into Health Districts (HDs) which are 
responsible for the implementation of primary care policies while LHAs retain a role of coordination. 
Therefore, we consider expenditures aggregated at the district level, separately considering spatial 
spillovers generated across HDs in different LHAs, from those among districts belonging to the same 
LHA. In order to assess whether the organisation and characteristics of primary care affect spatial 
patterns in hospital expenditures, we perform separate analysis for episodes of potentially 
inappropriate utilisation of the hospital and for those associated to complex medical treatments. By 
doing so, we treat separately those cases more likely to be affected by the access to effective 
primary care services from those treatments that are not expected to be influenced by them.  
2. Institutional setting 
The Italian NHS is organised on a regional basis with the National Government retaining the right to 
set the basic principles and Regional Governments enjoying a large autonomy in financing and 
organising the delivery of care (Lo Scalzo et al. 2009). Within each region, Local Health Authorities 
(LHAs) are in charge of delivering care to the resident population and are mainly financed by the 
Regional Health Department using a capitation formula adjusted for the demographic composition 
of the population. 
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As for hospital care, three main types of facilities can be identified. The largest, high qualified 
centres, including also all University Hospitals, enjoy the status of autonomous Hospital Trusts (HTs). 
The HT status is held also by other third level facilities, specialised in assistance and medical research 
typically dealing with a single clinical area and acting as a reference centres at the regional and 
national level. In most Regions, all other hospitals are directly run by the LHAs and they include 
medium-sized hospitals located in urban contexts (type A Hospitals), and community hospitals 
located in small towns or in rural contexts (type B Hospitals). The main funding source for HTs is a 
prospective payment scheme based on Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) but DRG tariffs play a 
relevant role in budget setting also for the LHA-run hospitals (Cappellari et al., 2014). Indeed, the 
budget for both type A and type B hospitals is agreed with the LHA according to the volume of 
activity produced in the previous year, and the value of the services provided is quantified using DRG 
tariffs that take into account the different cost structures across types of hospitals. In addition to 
that, both HTs and LHA-run centres receive ad hoc funding for specific programs and objectives, in 
particular to cover the costs of clinical areas with a high fixed cost component and of services of 
general interest such as emergency care. Hospital care is free at the point of need and is accessed 
either through the Emergency Department or through a referral by patient’s own GP. Patients can 
choose any public or privately accredited facility in the country: mobility is in fact allowed not only 
across LHAs but also across Regions. The empirical evidence shows that interregional mobility 
involves a non-negligible share of patients and concentrates mainly on highly specialised treatments 
(Fabbri and Robone, 2010; Balia et al., 2014) Moreover, differences in waiting times for eligible 
treatments together with free patients’ mobility generate incentives to shop around in search of 
faster responses not only for outpatient but also for inpatient services (Fattore et al., 2013).  
Access to primary care is free of charge. GPs are independent entrepreneurs contracted by the 
Regional Government and are responsible for providing ambulatory services and for referring their 
patients to specialist and hospital providers. Registration with a GP is compulsory and the choice of 
the physician can be modified at any time, though the empirical evidence suggests that switches are 
infrequent (Italian Ministry of Health, 2010). Community services fall under the main responsibility 
of Health Districts (HDs) that are sub-entities of LHAs. The HD’s management bodies are appointed 
by the LHA director as LHAs are in charge of financing HDs’ activity and of planning and coordinating 
local health policies, in particular for the component that relates to the connection between primary 
and secondary care. GPs operate in single handed practices, although there is a trend towards the 
creation of professional networks among family physicians in order to favour cooperation on 
dimensions that include substitution in case of absence and information sharing about clinical best 
practices (Compagni et al., 2014; Lippi Bruni et al. 2014). The integration of physicians’ activity can 
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be further extended as GPs may choose to share medical equipment, nursing staff and premises. 
However, even in these cases, each citizen is registered with a specific physician and not with the 
network as a whole. Hence, the list of enrolled patients is univocally attributed to a specific 
physician. GPs are paid for the most part using a capitation scheme contracted at the national level. 
Remuneration can be topped up by additional payments agreed at the district level. These transfers 
are usually aimed at incentivising high quality of care for specific conditions, including chronic 
diseases (Fiorentini et al. 2011; Iezzi et al. 2014) and physicians’ adherence to clinical guidelines and 
to cost containment strategies defined at the local level.  
 
3. Contextual framework 
The path-breaking work on social interactions by Manski (1993) provides a useful framework to 
classify the possible sources of spillovers across neighbourhoods or jurisdictions. Three types of 
effects are typically referred to in the literature: endogenous, exogenous and correlated effects. The 
endogenous effects consist of the changes in the behaviour of a given subject in response to the 
choice of the others; the exogenous/contextual effects follow from similar exogenous characteristics 
among neighbouring units; the correlated effects consist of the influence of unobserved features 
either related to individual characteristics or to the common environment shared by contiguous 
units
2
. In the context of the present study, all these effects can be thought as potentially affecting 
hospital expenditure patterns. As for the links between primary and secondary care, endogenous 
effects can be associated in first place to imitation patterns in the adoption of successful policies and 
best practices among health districts as well as among physicians. Such process of knowledge 
transfer is likely to be more intense for contiguous units, thus affecting professional behaviour and 
local practice styles, which in turn may influence utilisation rates of the hospital and the associated 
expenditures. As for the contextual effects, expenditures in neighbouring HDs may display high 
spatial correlation because, for example, an hospital centre serves more than one district
3
. In 
addition to that, hospitals might also devote effort to attract patients from different LHAs when 
tariffs are set above the marginal cost of treatment. Since the propensity of patients to shop around 
for higher quality or more timely responses to their needs quickly decreases with distance (Lippi 
Bruni et al. 2008), geographical proximity is likely to strongly affect the empirical relevance of these 
processes. However, also other institutional features of the NHS, characterised by a multilevel 
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 Manski (1993) discusses in detail the impossibility to separately identify the three types of effects, unless one 
is ready to make very strong assumptions, an issue known in the literature as the “reflection problem”.  
3
 Moscone et al. (2007) refer to this feature of health care  systems in the context of spatial analysis as “the 
shared resource hypothesis”.  
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organisatio, may contribute to spatial clustering. Indeed, the patterns described above may differ in 
intensity according to whether geographically contiguous units belong to the same upper layer level 
of care (here, the same LHA) or not.  
Overall, the vertical and horizontal relations that characterise both the institutional and professional 
level generate overlaps of planning responsibilities and interdependencies which may lead to a 
considerable geographical heterogeneity health care policies – including those implemented at the 
primary care level- across jurisdictions and to clusters in professional connections among physicians. 
To the extent that the organisation of primary care and the nature of professional relationships 
affect referrals to the hospital, all these factors can potentially induce spillovers across practices and 
health jurisdictions which should be properly accounted for in empirical analysis. 
From a positive perspective, neglecting the impact of spatial spillovers may generate spurious effects 
on the coefficients of the determinants of hospital utilisation and introduce a bias in the estimated 
impact of the explanatory variables. From a normative perspective, as policymakers are increasingly 
interested in monitoring performance of low tier jurisdictions- including their capacity to limit the 
degree of inappropriateness in hospital utilisation - failing to control for spatial spillovers and for the 
specific role of institutional borders may lead to a flawed evaluation.  
 
4. The data 
We use administrative data from the Italian Region Emilia Romagna for the period 2007-2010 and 
consider expenditures aggregated at the district level. The estimating sample covers 3,353,824 
citizens (aged 14 or above) who are followed by 2,780 GPs operating in 38 Health Districts
4
. The data 
used in the study are drawn from administrative databanks collected by the regional Department of 
Health, partly referring to of primary care and partly to hospital care.  
As regards the use of hospital services, we exploit Hospital Discharge Records (HDRs) which allow to 
track all hospitalisations for all patients residing in the Region, irrespectively of whether they are 
treated in an hospital located within the Region or outside. Patients’ hospital expenditure is 
computed attributing to each episode the monetary value expressed by the tariff recognised by the 
Regional Department of Health if the patient is treated by an hospital within the Region, or by the 
national tariff if he is treated in a different region
5
. The tariff depends on the DRG category and on 
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 The figures reported for patients and GPs refer to the yearly average over the observation period.  
5
 National tariffs are on average lower than the Emilia Romagna’s ones, because of intense negotiations that 
took place at the national level over the years aimed at discouraging strategic behaviour among regions trying 
to attract patients from other areas of the country. 
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the type of hospital, with HT and type A hospitals receiving a higher compensation than type B 
hospitals in recognition of the higher fixed costs they face compared to community hospitals. The 
baseline DRG tariff is augmented in case of complications or when the length of stay exceeds a pre-
defined threshold. For each hospitalisation, the information on the tariff, comprehensive of the 
aforementioned possible adjustments, is included in the HDRs and it is used to construct our 
dependent variable. For each district in each year we sum the tariffs of all hospitalisations of all 
patients above 18 who reside in the district, and we then compute the per-patient average 
expenditure for acute hospital care at the district level which is the dependent variable for our 
model.  
In order to evaluate the role of primary care services in generating spatial spillovers in the use of 
hospital services, we consider expenditures for hospitalisations expected to be influenced by GP’s 
activity separately from hospital expenditures for largely unaffected by GP’s decisions. For this 
purpose, we include in the first group the episodes of potentially inappropriate utilisation of the 
hospital, as identified by the Regional Health Department of Emilia Romagna by means of a list of 
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) at risk of inappropriate hospitalisation. These are conditions whose 
frequency can be reduced by effective primary care provision. The second group encompasses highly 
complex treatments, whose occurrence is deemed to fall beyond the control of family physicians. To 
the extent that geographical heterogeneity in the delivery of primary care contributes to spatial 
clustering in hospital expenditures, local spillovers are expected to be larger for avoidable 
hospitalisations compared to complex treatments, that are influenced by utilization of primary care 
relatively less. 
The descriptive statistics for the two dependent variables are reported in Table 1 for each year 
covered in our study.  
TABLE 1 HERE 
The data indicate that hospitalisations for potentially avoidable episodes generate an amount of 
expenditures that ranges roughly between one third and one half of the expenditures associated to 
highly complex treatments, with the former accounting for around 15% and the latter accounting for 
38% of total expenditures over the four-year time span. Over time, we record a slight downward 
trend in expenditures for complex treatments, while potentially inappropriate expenditures show a 
remarkable increase between 2008 and 2009. For estimation purposes both dependent variables are 
log transformed.  
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As for the explanatory variables, a first set of controls, measured at the district level, accounts for 
the characteristics and organisation of GPs’ practices. These include the average GP’s seniority 
(GP_seniority), the share of associated practices (share_assoc_GPs), the share of practices with 
nursing staff (share_nurse) or administrative collaborators (share_collaborator). A second group of 
indicators captures the socio-demographic composition of the health districts with the shares for 
age classes (the group 14-36 is taken as reference), the proportion of males (share_males) and of 
foreigners (share_foreigners)  entering as regressors.  
Additional information is exploited to control for the features of the local health care systems and 
include: the density of GPs in each HD (num_GP); the per capita number of hospital beds 
(beds_LHA), of physicians, nurses and clerks employed by the local LHAs (doctors_LHA, nurses_LHA, 
clerks_LHA, respectively); the raw LHA mortality rate (mort_LHA). We add also a dummy for the 
presence of HT in the HD (HD with HT) and a dummy for the presence of a type A hospital (HD with 
type A hosp). Finally, geographical features are controlled for with a dummy for districts located in 
partially or totally mountainous areas (mountainous area), while local socio-economic conditions are 
proxied by per-capita taxable income (income_HD) measured at the HD level. All variables, whose 
descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2, are log-transformed except for the dummy variables. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
5. The empirical methodology 
5.1. The standard spatial panel regression models 
The standard linear panel data models assume the absence of cross-sectional correlation among the 
units of observation so that they are not suitable to account for spatial dependence among 
geographical units. In fact, ignoring the potential spatial dependence either in observable or 
unobservable variables may bias the estimates of the coefficients of interest (LeSage and Pace, 
2009).  
A proper way to deal with spatial spillovers, either exogenous or endogenous, is to estimate spatial 
panel data models which allow to incorporate spatial dependence (Elhorst, 2003, 2014) by means of 
the inclusion of spatially autocorrelated disturbances and/or spatially lagged dependent and control 
variables. The inclusion of the spatially lagged dependent variable allows for endogenous spillover 
effects, that is for a causal link between the dependent variables of two different geographical units 
(feedback effect). On the other hand, the inclusion of spatially lagged regressors allows for potential 
exogenous spatial interaction effects. In this way it is possible to test whether a change in a 
regressor in a given geographical unit affects the outcome variable of the neighbouring units. 
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Allowing for autocorrelated errors permits to take into account spatial interaction effects in 
unobservables among units. 
A general formulation of the spatial panel model reads as: 
 =  + +	 + 
 +  + 										() 
 =  + 										() 
where  includes the  ×  observations on the dependent variable,  is a matrix of regressors, 
 
is a vector of time-invariant spatial effects that may be either fixed or random,  is a vector of time 
effects either random or fixed and  is the vector of disturbances. The crucial feature of such model 
is the presence of the  ×  symmetric weight matrix  that summarises the pairwise spatial 
relationships between the units in the sample. The choice about the structure of the spatial weight 
matrix , specifically targeted on the purposes of our analysis will be extensively treated in a 
dedicated section. As discussed in Elhorst (2010, 2014), the spatial autoregressive term  
accounts for endogenous spatial interaction effects among the dependent variable across different 
spatial units; the inclusion of spatially lagged regressors in  allows for exogenous spatial 
interactions among the regressors while  allows for spatial correlations among the disturbances. 
The assumptions on which interactions effects can be excluded from the model, and therefore on 
which parameters (the spatial autoregressive coefficient , the vector 	 including the coefficients of 
spatially lagged regressor or the spatial autocorrelation coefficient ) should be set to zero, 
determine alternative specifications of the spatial panel model to be estimated. In what follows we 
consider three specifications of the model in (1) and (2): assuming that  = 	 =  = 0 , we are back 
to the standard linear panel model with no spatial effects that we estimate by Pooled OLS, by fixed-
effects (FE) o by random-effects (RE) estimators; we then estimate a Spatial AutoRegressive (SAR) 
model which assumes both 	 =  and  = 0 so that only endogenous interaction effects take place; 
finally, we only assume that  = 0 and we estimate a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) which allows for 
both endogenous and exogenous spatial interactions. The SAR model comes out as the most natural 
choice when we are interested in exploring spatial spillovers in hospital expenditures, since we 
expect in this context the endogenous interactions to be particularly significant. By estimating a SDM 
we also include spatially lagged regressors which, as discussed in LeSage and Pace (2009), control for 
the omission of relevant variables correlated with the included covariates. A further advantage of 
the SDM specification is that it provides consistent estimates even when the true model is a SAR. As 
in our analysis the sample includes the whole population of interest, namely all the Health Districts 
in the Region, and the observations cannot be seen as drawn from a larger population, the fixed 
effect specification is the most appropriate one for the model with spatial effects. Furthermore, the 
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fixed-effects specification allows for a correlation between the regressors and the individual-specific 
effects, that might actually be a concern is such framework.. Throughout our analysis we will 
therefore assume the spatial effects in 
 to be deterministic. The Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
estimates of the model in equations (1) and (2), either in the SAR and in the SDM specifications, are 
obtained by using the xsmle command in Stata. 
5.2.  The spatial weight matrix  
The spatial weight matrix W captures the connections among the spatial units observed in the 
sample. W has to be specified prior to the estimation of the model and a wide range of alternative 
structures are potentially available for it, in order to weigh the spatial observations based, for 
instance, on geographical, institutional, economic or social proximity or on distance. Each cell  of 
the W matrix reflects the intensity of the spatial interaction between unit i and unit j, or, stated 
differently, the spatial influence of unit j on unit i. By convention,  = 0, so that the W matrix has a 
zero diagonal.  
The first part of our empirical analysis follows the standard approach of the literature and thus 
implements an estimation strategy based on a single weighting matrix. Given the feature of the 
institutional context that is characterised by a two-tier level of jurisdictions with HDs nested into 
LHAs, one can consider two alternative specifications of the W matrix. The first one is based on mere 
geographical contiguity among spatial entities, as captured by shared borders between two 
neighbouring HDs. In this case, the cell  assumes value of 1 if the i
th 
HD shares a common border 
with the j
th 
HD and 0 otherwise, irrespectively of whether they belong to the same LHA or not. Here, 
when estimating a SAR or SDM model, for each HD the spatially lagged dependent variable is a 
weighted average of the health expenditures in the neighbouring HDs. The second specification 
extends the notion of “neighbourhood” adopting a metrics that includes also the institutional 
proximity among HDs alongside the geographical one. In this case, we slightly modify the previous 
weight matrix as follows: the W matrix has cell  = 1 not only if HD i and HD j share the same 
border but also if they belong to the same LHA, and zero if two HDs neither have a common border 
nor belong to the same LHA. The rationale behind the specification of this second weight matrix is 
that HDs that belong to the same LHA are subjects to the same institutional constraints and are 
affected by the same healthcare policies promoted by the LHA, though they might not have any 
border in common. As standard in the literature, we row-standardise the weight matrix so that the 
weights are always in the range 0-1 and the spatially lagged variables are a weighted average of the 
neighbours’ observed values for those variables. 
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5.3.  Accounting for institutional constraints 
In order to gain further insights on the impact of institutional constraints on spatial patterns in 
expenditures, it is useful to disentangle the sources of spatial dependence when the geographical 
units of interest are subject to different institutional constraints. In a recent contribution which 
extends Lacombe (2004), Atella et al. (2014) propose an empirical approach designed for this 
purpose. They exploit two different contiguity matrices that result from the partition of a standard 
contiguity matrix denoted by : the first one, labeled within matrix, defines contiguity among units 
that are subject to the same institutional setting; the second one, labeled between matrix, defines 
contiguity among spatial entities which share a common border but that belong to different higher-
level jurisdictions. The cell 	
  of the within matrix, denoted by !, takes value of 1 if entity i and 
entity j share a common border and are subject to the same jurisdiction and 0 otherwise. In the 
between matrix ", the cell 	
#  is 1 if entity i and entity j share a common border but belong to 
different LHAs and 0 otherwise. 
Such approach is particularly appealing for the purposes of our work and given the institutional 
framework that characterizes the Italian NHS. Therefore, in order to disentangle the two alternative 
sources of spatial dependence, we partition the contiguity matrix  discussed in the previous 
section into the two matrices ! and ". Following Atella et al (2014), we disentangle the 
endogenous from the exogenous interaction effects in a within and a between component, so that a 
modified version of the model in (1) encompassing the partition into the two sources of dependence 
becomes: 
 =  ! + #" +  +!	! +"	" + 
 +  + 	.										(%) 
We estimate the model in (3) following both a fixed-effect SAR specification and a fixed-effect SDM 
model.  can be specified according to the two formulations discussed in the previous section and 
accounts for either pure geographic contiguity or geographic/institutional proximity; in this 
extension, such matrix is now partitioned in the two components. The " is the same in both cases 
and the cells have values 	
# = 1 when two HDs have a common border but belong to different 
LHAs. As for the within matrix, 	
 = 1 for districts that share a border and belong to the same LHA 
when a strict criterion of geographical proximity is adopted; instead, when we also account for the 
institutional proximity of non-adjacent HDs, 	
 = 1 in the case that two districts are in the same 
LHA no matter whether they share a common border. The model in (3) is estimated in Stata 
exploiting the user-written command spm. 
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6. Results 
Our empirical strategy follows three steps. We start by estimating for both dependent variables a 
standard linear panel data model that does not account for spatial correlation across observations 
by Pooled OLS, FE and RE estimators (Table 3).  
TABLE 3 HERE 
The results obtained at this stage serve as a benchmark for a first assessment of the implications of 
failing to take into account potentially relevant characteristics of the data at hand, such as the 
presence of spatial patterns, when evaluating the determinants of hospital expenditures.  
As a second step, we specify our econometric model in such a way to account for spatial correlation 
across observations. In particular, we consider a fixed-effect SAR and a fixed-effect SDM model 
specification and, at this stage, we exploit a single weight matrix - which may be , !, " - 
where  may based on two slightly different definitions of contiguity discussed in detail in section 
5.2 and consequently also the partition in the two matrices !, and ". Since the main aim of the 
paper is to assess the overall relevance of spatial spillovers in expenditures across districts, we first 
present and discuss the results for the spatial autoregressive component, namely the estimates of 
the coefficients  in model (1).  
TABLE 4 HERE 
Table 4 reports the estimates for the spatial autoregressive coefficients for the two dependent 
variables introduced in previous sections. The default case corresponds to a single matrix where 
proximity is defined according to a geographical criterion, i.e. whether two HDs share a common 
border. The subscript _LHA  indicates a departure from the default case and an institutional metrics 
is added to the geographical one, such that are classified as “neighbours” also all the HDs in the 
same LHA irrespectively of whether they share a border or not. 
For potentially inappropriate expenditures, the estimates of the spatial effects generally come out 
positive and statistically significant, the only exception being the case in which the only matrix used 
is ". The large magnitude of the coefficients, ranging when significant between 0.32 and 0.50, 
points to the presence of strong interaction effects among HDs. The comparison between SAR and 
SDM results when exploiting  provides evidence that, once we control also for spatially lagged 
regressors and we allow for exogenous spatial effects, the estimated endogenous interactions are 
smaller, though the coefficient is still about 0.3. Moving to the “augmented” weight matrix, we find 
evidence of stronger interactions among HDs than in the case in which only geographic proximity is 
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considered. The spatial effects estimated exploiting ! are, in the case of SDM, very close to those 
estimated using the augmented , while no “between” spatial effects emerge: this evidence points 
to the finding that in this context stronger spatial interactions among HDs intervene when they 
belong to the same LHA. 
When we consider expenditures associated to highly complex DRGs, the estimated spatial effects are 
weaker and in most cases not significant, pointing to a limited evidence of spatial spillovers for 
outcomes that are not expected to be affected by differences in primary care organization. 
Interestingly, in the only case when the spatial autoregressive coefficient is significant at the 5% 
level, the estimated sign is negative: this confirms that the nature of the interactions across 
jurisdictions for the two type of treatments is very different. 
Overall, these results are consistent with the idea that heterogeneity in primary care activity may 
represent an important source of spatial clustering for hospital expenditures. Indeed, when 
controlling for a set of primary care characteristics, the hospital expenditures expected to be 
sensitive to GP decisions display a strong spatial correlation. 
Table 5 presents the results for the SAR and SDM specifications for the case of a single weight 
matrix. In the table, we report the estimates for the coefficients ,  and 	 in model (1), as well as 
the total spatial effects disentangled also in the direct and indirect components.  
TABLE 5 HERE 
The explanatory power of the control variables included in the analysis appears weak for both the 
dependent variables considered. Partial exception is the demographic composition of the district 
population where a higher share of individuals aged between 36-50 is positively associated to 
expenditure levels, in particular when we consider the direct effect measured for inappropriate 
episodes. Higher average GP seniority is in some cases significantly associated to lower expenditures, 
both for inappropriate and complex conditions, and again the effect emerges as significant for the 
direct effects. 
Finally, the third step of the analysis consists of the estimation of the model in (3) using two weights 
matrices. Table 6 reports the estimates of the spatial autoregressive coefficients    and # in model 
(3) for the SAR and SDM specifications and both the dependent variables when two spatial weights 
matrices are used at the same time. 
TABLE 6 HERE 
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When we employ the double matrix, for potentially inappropriate expenditures both the within and 
the between spatial effects are estimated as large in magnitude and highly statistically significant. 
While we find no relevant differences in the estimated effects according on whether we take the 
standard or the “augmented” weight matrix to be partitioned, it is particularly interesting to 
consider how the spatial interactions can be disentangled in a within and a between component. 
Taking the SDM results as the benchmark since the estimates are consistent also when the true DGP 
is a SAR (LeSage, 2014), we find that the interactions within the same LHA account for about three 
fourths of the total endogenous spillover; while one fourth can be attributed to interactions 
between neighbouring areas belonging to different institutional settings, as defined by the LHAs. The 
absence of spatial spillovers for expenditures associated to high-complexity treatments emerge here 
as clear-cut. None of the spatial autoregressive coefficients, in neither components, comes out as 
statistically significant.  Finally, in Table 7 we present the estimates of the coefficients 
 , # , , 	!, 	" for the SAR and SDM specifications of the model in (3).  
TABLE 7 HERE 
7. Conclusions 
The present paper aimed at empirically assessing the presence of spatial effects on hospital 
expenditures at the district level. Its main purpose was to investigate the contribution to 
geographical clustering in expenditures of primary care, as it represents a largely overlooked, albeit 
important, potential source of heterogeneity across health jurisdictions which may significantly 
affect also the intensity and degree of appropriateness of hospital utilisation. Moreover, we exploit 
an empirical strategy designed to separately evaluate the effects of spatial spillovers within and 
between healthcare jurisdictions and to address the influence of both geographical and institutional 
proximity among health districts.  
We conduct a district level analysis since, in the Italian NHS, this is the institutional level in charge of 
designing and coordinating health policies in primary care. We separately considered two types of 
hospital expenditures: those associated to episodes of potentially inappropriate use of hospital 
services and those associated to complex medical treatments. Such choice is based on the 
conjecture that the former group of expenditures is affected by the delivery of effective primary care 
services, preventive measures and accurate gatekeeping, as the recourse to the hospital is deemed 
to be potentially avoidable in these cases. On the contrary, the latter type of expenditures relates to 
conditions that typically fall beyond the control of community services, including primary care 
providers.  
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Our main findings indicate that spatial effects are significant and large in magnitude for potentially 
inappropriate expenditures while they generally emerge as non-significant when considering 
expenditures for complex medical treatments. Moreover, the separate evaluation of geographical 
and institutional proximity indicates that the impact of spatial effects within the same jurisdiction is 
larger within the same jurisdiction compared to the effects between jurisdictions.  
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Table 1- Dependent variables 
Dep. Var. Definition Mean St. 
Dev. 
Mean St. 
Dev. 
Mean St. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
pot_inappr_exp  Expenditures for potentially inappropriate 
procedures  (Euros per capita) 
76.33 9 .67 72.29 9.49 115.68 14.04 106.61 12.99 
high_compl_exp Expenditures for highly complex hospital 
procedures (Euros per capita) 
246.68 22.69 242.44 23.15 232.98 23.64 233.29 22.81 
Year  2007 2008 2009 2010 
Data are expressed in Euro per capita (residents are aged 14 or above). 
 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
  
Variable Definition Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
GP_seniority average seniority of GPs in the HD 20.51 1.87 15.18 24.26 
share_nurse HD share of GP practices with nurse 9.98 10.13 0.00 51.22 
share_collaborator HD share of GP practices with collaborator 29.32 12.56 4.26 73.17 
share_assoc GPs HD share of associated practices  81.23 13.61 32.61 100.00 
share_36_50 HD share of patients aged 36-50 27.91 1.52 23.60 31.56 
share_ 51_65 HD share of patients aged 51-65 21.27 0.88 19.64 24.15 
share_ over 65 HD share of patients aged over 65 25.63 2.73 19.72 30.95 
share_males HD share of male patients  48.13 0.78 45.55 49.34 
share_foreigners HD share of foreign patients  7.09 1.75 2.89 11.60 
num_GP Per-capita number of GPs in the HD  0.000743 0.000059 0.000609 0.000860 
beds_LHA Per-capita number of hospital beds in the LHA  3.92 0.76 2.85 5.44 
doctors_LHA Per-capita number of hospital doctors in the LHA 0.002156 0.000214 0.001805 0.002561 
nurses_LHA Per-capita number of hospital nurses in the LHA  0.007597 0.000847 0.006504 0.009282 
clerks_LHA Per-capita number of hospital clerks in the LHA  0.002765 0.000421 0.002139 0.003667 
mort_LHA LHA mortality rate 10.78 1.09 9.03 12.96 
Income_HD HD per-capita taxable income   22642.97 2193.16 17911.97 28719.41 
HD wih HT Districts with  Hospital Trust (dummy) 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
HD with type A hosp Districts with Type A hospital (dummy) 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
mountainous area HD in totally or partially mountainous areas (dummy) 0.13 0.28 0.00 1.00 
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Table 3. Pooled OLS, FE and RE estimates of a linear panel model with no spatial effects 
 
  
Dep Variable pot_inappr_exp high_compl_exp 
 POLS  FE RE POLS  FE RE 
 (b/se) (b/se) (b/se) (b/se) (b/se) (b/se) 
GP_seniority -0.004 -3.676** -0.195 -0.129 -2.100* -0.168 
 (-0.148) (-1.349) (-0.2593) (-0.089)) (-0.8184) (-0.1537) 
share_nurse 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* -0.001 0.000 
 (-0.0009) (-0.0015) (-0.0012) (-0.0005) (-0.0009) (-0.0007) 
share_collaborator 0.012 0.012 0.036 -0.023 0.02 -0.001 
 (-0.0224) (-0.0392) (-0.0295) (-0.0135) (-0.0238) (-0.0173) 
share_assoc GPs 0.010 -0.075 -0.047 0.093** -0.009 0.037 
 (-0.0521) (-0.0927) (-0.0688) (-0.0313) (-0.0562) (-0.0403) 
share_36_50 0.505 2.726* 0.751 0.596* -0.861 0.206 
 (-0.3915) (-1.1474) (-0.6104) (-0.2356) (-0.6961) (-0.3593) 
share_ 51_65 -0.148 0.834 -0.007 0.421 0.373 0.348 
 (-0.3614) (-1.0721) (-0.5559) (-0.2175) (-0.6504) (-0.3275) 
share_ over 65 0.468* 0.316 0.713 0.674*** 0.168 0.590** 
 (-0.2276) (-0.9245) (-0.3768) (-0.137) (-0.5609) (-0.2222) 
share_males -0.99 3.554 -0.836 0.915 1.382 0.913 
 (-1.0127) (-3.9976) (-1.7935) (-0.6093) (-2.4252) (-1.0601) 
share_foreigners -0.061 -0.018 -0.043 0.006 -0.109 0.020 
 (-0.055) (-0.2501) (-0.0956) (-0.0331) (-0.1517) (-0.0565) 
num_GP -0.319 -0.765* -0.439 -0.101 0.381 0.049 
 (-0.188) (-0.3272) (-0.2312) (-0.1131) (-0.1985) (-0.1351) 
beds_LHA -0.100 0.288 -0.243 0.148* 0.130 0.070 
 (-0.1132) (-0.3007) (-0.1494) (-0.0681 (-0.1824) (-0.0876) 
doctors_LHA 0.852** -0.566 0.288 0.337* -0.133 0.093 
 (-0.2712) (-0.3647) (-0.2996) (-0.1632) (-0.2212) (-0.1748) 
nurses_LHA -0.239 1.109* 0.248 -0.350* -0.100 -0.127 
 (-0.2722) (-0.5001) (-0.3434) (-0.1638) (-0.3034) (-0.2009) 
clerks_LHA -0.293 0.299 -0.095 -0.310** -0.099 -0.171 
 (-0.1915) (-0.3188) (-0.221) (-0.1152) (-0.1934) (-0.1293) 
mort_LHA 0.509*** 0.747 0.413 0.438*** 0.062 0.299* 
 (-0.14) (-0.4609) (-0.2288) (-0.0842) (-0.2796) (-0.1349) 
Income_HD 0.126 0.576 0.055 -0.093 -0.405 -0.034 
 (-0.1334) (-0.905) (-0.2439) (-0.0803) (-0.549) (-0.1445) 
HD wih HT 0.021  0.006 0.064**  0.039 
 (-0.0383)  (-0.0703) (-0.0231)  (-0.0417) 
HD with type A hosp 0.053*  0.066 0.097***  0.074* 
 (-0.0266)  (-0.0489) (-0.016)  (-0.029) 
mountainous area 0.238***  0.201* -0.078**  -0.121* 
 (-0.047)  (-0.0873) (-0.0283)  (-0.0518) 
cons 3.436 -20.638 1.874 -6.062* 12.250 -2.623 
 (-5.0526) (-21.3469) (-9.0034) (-3.0401) (-12.9504) (-5.323) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4. Estimates of the spatial autoregressive coefficient – Single Spatial Weights Matrix 
 
Spatial Autoregressive  Model (SAR) Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) 
Single weight  
matrix 
pot_inappr_exp high_compl_exp 
Single weight  
matrix 
pot_inappr_exp high_compl_exp 
ρ ALL 0.496*** -0.039 ρ ALL 0.241*** -0.120 
ρ ALL_LHA 0.581*** -0.073 ρ ALL_LHA 0.319*** -0.203** 
ρ WI 0.323*** 0.096 ρ WI 0.322*** 0.054 
ρ WI_ LHA 0.357*** 0.102 ρ WI_ LHA 0.320*** 0.012 
ρ BE 0.012 -0.043 ρ BE 0.059 -0.122* 
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Table 5. SAR and SDM estimation results (coefficients and spatial effects) – Single weights matrix  
 SAR SAR SDM SDM 
Dep Var pot_inappr_exp high_compl_exp pot_inappr_exp high_compl_exp 
Main     
GP_seniority -2.759* -2.113*** -2.152 -1.704* 
share_nurse 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
share_collaborator 0.012 0.021 0.024 0.039 
share_assoc GPs -0.072 -0.009 -0.019 0.026 
share_36_50 2.830** -0.856 1.930* -0.947 
share_ 51_65 1.018 0.384 0.165 0.704 
share_ over 65 0.67 0.156 0.398 -0.047 
share_males 3.752 1.352 2.445 0.714 
share_foreigners 0.058 -0.105 0.095 -0.038 
num_GP -0.603* 0.378 -0.695* 0.331 
beds_LHA 0.084 0.136 -0.03 -0.023 
doctors_LHA -0.517 -0.135 -1.011* 0.191 
nurses_LHA 0.702 -0.087 0.352 -0.83 
clerks_LHA 0.368 -0.104 0.613 -0.221 
mort_LHA 0.478 0.064 0.323 -0.075 
Income_HD 0.026 -0.407 -0.268 -0.774 
Spatial rho 0.496*** -0.039 0.241** -0.12 
     
Direct effects     
GP_seniority -3.003** -2.131*** -2.285* -1.719* 
share_nurse 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
share_collaborator 0.015 0.021 0.027 0.036 
share_assoc GPs -0.079 -0.009 -0.009 0.023 
share_36_50 3.254*** -0.713 1.822** -0.818 
share_ 51_65 1.365 0.526 0.395 0.756 
share_ over 65 0.804 0.177 0.373 0.052 
share_males 4.164 1.398 2.909 0.843 
share_foreigners 0.065 -0.105 0.054 -0.042 
num_GP -0.643 0.378 -0.796* 0.334 
beds_LHA 0.077 0.147 -0.001 -0.015 
doctors_LHA -0.594 -0.133 -1.036* 0.193 
nurses_LHA 0.759 -0.079 0.398 -0.829 
clerks_LHA 0.36 -0.124 0.56 -0.242 
mort_LHA 0.567 0.091 0.4 -0.048 
Income_HD -0.062 -0.405 -0.123 -0.824 
     
Indirect Effects     
GP_seniority -2.492* 0.083 -2.297 0.216 
share_nurse 0.001 0 0.001 0 
share_collaborator 0.014 -0.001 0.001 0.115* 
share_assoc GPs -0.069 -0.001 0.211 0.077 
share_36_50 2.658** 0.017 -5.072 1.452 
share_ 51_65 1.136 -0.027 1.697 3.178* 
share_ over 65 0.671 0.004 -2.672 -1.002 
share_males 3.528 -0.084 10.932 -4.844 
share_foreigners 0.051 0.001 -0.792 0.419 
num_GP -0.519 -0.016 -1.967* -0.236 
beds_LHA 0.066 -0.012 0.591 0.195 
doctors_LHA -0.489 0.011 0.485 -0.329 
nurses_LHA 0.607 -0.015 0.197 1.515* 
clerks_LHA 0.311 0.011 0.218 0.359 
mort_LHA 0.474 -0.004 1.733 -0.248 
Income_HD -0.088 0.019 2.914 -0.507 
     
Total Effects     
GP_seniority -5.495* -2.048*** -4.582 -1.503 
share_nurse 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0 
share_collaborator 0.029 0.02 0.028 0.150** 
share_assoc GPs -0.148 -0.01 0.202 0.1 
share_36_50 5.912*** -0.696 -3.25 0.634 
share_ 51_65 2.502 0.499 2.092 3.934** 
share_ over 65 1.475 0.181 -2.299 -0.95 
share_males 7.692 1.314 13.842 -4.001 
share_foreigners 0.116 -0.105 -0.737 0.377 
num_GP -1.162* 0.362 -2.763* 0.098 
beds_LHA 0.143 0.135 0.59 0.18 
doctors_LHA -1.083 -0.122 -0.551 -0.136 
nurses_LHA 1.366 -0.094 0.594 0.686 
clerks_LHA 0.671 -0.113 0.778 0.117 
mort_LHA 1.041 0.087 2.133* -0.296 
Income_HD -0.15 -0.386 2.79 -1.331 
     
Wx     
GP_seniority   -1.023 0.158 
share_nurse   0 0 
share_collaborator   -0.008 0.132* 
share_assoc GPs   0.161 0.101 
share_36_50   -4.333* 1.645 
share_ 51_65   1.264 3.474* 
share_ over 65   -2.481 -1.195 
share_males   8.785 -4.795 
share_foreigners   -0.675 0.437 
num_GP   -1.399* -0.212 
beds_LHA   0.523 0.23 
doctors_LHA   0.727 -0.272 
nurses_LHA   0.151 1.647** 
clerks_LHA   -0.096 0.291 
mort_LHA   1.274 -0.3 
Income_HD   2.691 -0.559 
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Table 6. Estimates of the within and between spatial autoregressive coefficient – Double Spatial 
Weights Matrix 
Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) 
Double weight  
Matrix 
pot_inappr_exp high_compl_exp 
Double weight  
Matrix 
pot_inappr_exp high_compl_exp 
ρ WI 0.548*** 0.106 ρ WI 0.631*** -0.008 
ρ BE 0.300*** 0.003 ρ BE 0.190*** -0.033 
ρ WI_ LHA 0.560*** 0.109 ρ WI__LHA 0.611*** -0.049 
ρ BE_ LHA 0.303*** 0.004 ρ BE_LHA 0.217*** -0.070 
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Table 7. SAR and SDM estimates - Double Spatial Weights Matrix 
 SAR SDM 
Dep Var pot_inappr_exp high_compl_exp pot_inappr_exp high_compl_exp 
     
Main     
GP_seniority -0.966 -0.564 2.709 -0.458 
share_nurse 0.001 0 0.002 0 
share_collaborator 0.06 0.032 0.058 0.01 
share_assoc GPs -0.183 0.001 -0.187 0.018 
share_36_50 2.309 -0.039 3.943** -1.103 
share_ 51_65 1.53 0.796 1.724 1.415* 
share_ over 65 0.978 0.499 3.096 -0.83 
share_males 3.216 0.097 6.292 3.855 
share_foreigners 0.302 -0.003 0.522 -0.057 
num_GP -0.708 0.288 -0.553 0.388 
beds_LHA 0.393 0.132 1.955 -1.02 
doctors_LHA -0.078 -0.001 -2.505 -0.262 
nurses_LHA 0.522 0.12 -11.527* 3.836* 
clerks_LHA 0.535 -0.251 10.168*** -2.541** 
mort_LHA -0.244 -0.117 11.399*** -3.178*** 
Income_HD -1.265 0.311 -0.025 -0.029 
     
Spatial effects     
Rho WITHIN 0.548*** 0.106 0.631*** -0.008 
Rho BEETWEEN 0.300** 0.003 0.190** -0.033 
     
Durbin Within                    
GP_seniority   -3.668 1.139 
share_nurse   0.002 0.001 
share_collaborator   -0.034 -0.059 
share_assoc GPs   -0.223 0.101 
share_36_50   -1.295 -0.871 
share_ 51_65   -1.537 -0.304 
share_ over 65   0.288 -3.640* 
share_males   4.63 -0.347 
share_foreigners   -0.113 -0.19 
num_GP   -0.894 -0.114 
beds_LHA   -2.263 1.088 
doctors_LHA   2.045 0.283 
nurses_LHA   13.030* -4.232* 
clerks_LHA   -9.839*** 2.764** 
mort_LHA   -11.566*** 3.865*** 
Income_HD   -0.311 1.655* 
     
Durbin Between     
GP_seniority   -0.291 -2.321 
share_nurse   -0.001 -0.001 
share_collaborator   0.038 0.06 
share_assoc GPs   0.004 0.01 
share_36_50   -0.142 2.216 
share_ 51_65   -0.66 3.089* 
share_ over 65   0.097 1.083 
share_males   11.035 1.917 
share_foreigners   -0.237 0.384 
num_GP   0.084 0.155 
beds_LHA   -0.367 -0.3 
doctors_LHA   1.008* -0.278 
nurses_LHA   0.161 0.527 
clerks_LHA   -0.98 0.206 
mort_LHA   -0.463 0.024 
Income_HD   -0.86 -0.803 
 
